« M E N U » |
»
|
» Ktoś, kto mówi, że nie zna się na sztuce, źle zna samego siebie. | » Aleksander SOŁŻENICYN - Dwieście lat razem t 2, E-books, Sołżenicyn Aleksander | » Aleksander Krawczuk - Kleopatra(1), e-books, e-książki, ksiązki, , .-y | » Alistair MacLean - Cyrk(1), e-books, e-książki, ksiązki, , .-y | » Alistair MacLean - Goodbye(2), e-books, e-książki, ksiązki, , .-y | » Alistair MacLean - Goodbye(1), e-books, e-książki, ksiązki, , .-y | » Aleksander Krawczuk - Ostatnia Olimpiada, e-books, e-książki, ksiązki, , .-y | » Alain Badiou - The Communist Hypothesis (2010), Communism - Books | » Alexander McCall Smith - Kobieca agencja detektywistyczna nr1(1), e-books, e-książki, ksiązki, , .-y | » Alistair Maclean - Szatanski Wirus-poprawiony(3), e-books, e-książki, ksiązki, , .-y | » Aldani Lino - Ksiezyc Dwudziestu Rak(1), e-books, e-książki, ksiązki, , .-y |
zanotowane.pldoc.pisz.plpdf.pisz.plets2.xlx.pl
|
|
[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ] Book Notes Aristotle and the Aristotelian Tradition KEIMPE ALGRA This will be my last set of booknotes on ‘Aristotle’: I am handing over this task to Ben Morison. Four of the books which I kept for this occa- sion concern aspects of the Aristotelian tradition (ancient, medieval and modern) rather than Aristotle himself, and I shall start with these. Robert Todd’s annotated translation of Themistius’ commentary on, or rather interpretative paraphrase of, Aristotle’s Physics IV, published in Richard Sorabji’s series ‘The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle’, is dedicated to the memory of Henry Blumenthal, to whose careful scholarship on the Aristotelian commentators we owe so much. 1 T.’s translation appears to be clear and reliable and his explanatory notes are brief (in accordance with the general format of the series) but generally adequate. In his intro- duction he characterizes Themistius’ paraphrases as targeted at readers who wished to revisit Aristotelian treatises with which they were already familiar, and as pitched at a level somewhere between strictly elementary expositions on the one hand and more expansive commentaries of the kind written by Alexander of Aphrodisias on the other. In a separate preface Sorabji more or less qualifies Blumenthal’s characterization of Themistius as a (or in fact: the last) ‘Peripatetic commentator’, by noting that there are some occasions where Themistius does side with contemporary Neoplatonism, as in his commentary on the DA where he rejects Aris- totle’s empiricist account of concept formation. True though this may be, such occasions are few and far between. In general Themistius stays pretty close to Aristotle, although he sometimes includes digressions offer- ing material that does not correspond with anything in Aristotle’s text. In the commentary on Physics IV we find two examples of this procedure, both directed against Galen’s attacks on Aristotle. One (149, 4-19) con- 1 Themistius On Aristotle’s Physics 4, translated by Robert B. Todd (series The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), Ithaca NY (Cornell University Press) 2003; x + 150 pp.; ISBN 0 8014 4103 X; $ 62.50. © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2005 Phronesis L/3 Also available online – BOOK NOTES 251 cerns the alleged circularity of Aristotle’s attempt to define time. The other (114, 7-12) discusses a thought experiment adduced by Galen to prove the existence of a self-subsistent three-dimensional space. Imagine a vessel with its contents removed and no other body flowing in. What are we to suppose will be left between its extremities? According to Themistius, Galen is begging the question by just assuming the existence of the void space which he is supposed to prove. In his Corollary on Place (576, 12 ff.) Philoponus will later claim that Galen is not assuming any such thing, but that he is just exploring the consequences of the assumption that no other body flows in. Themistius himself, by the way, brings in his own presup- positions: ‘eliminating the mutual replacement of bodies is no different from completely eliminating body’. In other words, he claims that Galen’s thought experiment ignores a fundamental principle of physics, viz. the theory of antiperistasis. As Todd suggests in his notes ad loc., there is a strong possibility that these anti-Galenic passages go back to Alexander of Aphrodisias, who is known to have attacked Galen’s views on place and time. So even here (pace Sorabji’s introduction, p. vii) ‘originality’ need not be the correct term. But of course in the history of ideas lack of originality does not entail insignificance, and instead of desperately look- ing for traces of originality we may simply value Themistius’ commen- tary on the Physics for what it is: a clear and intelligent survey which constituted an important link in the transmission of Aristotle’s ideas. It is good to have this part of it available in translation. As for the significance of Themistius in general, his paraphrases enjoyed great popularity among the Aristotelian commentators of late antiquity and, in Latin translations, in the Aristotelian tradition in the later Middle Ages and the early modern period. His commentary on the De Anima, for example, played an important role in the late medieval debate on the immortality of the individual intellect. In the 15th century Nicoletto Vernia’s Padovan lec- tures on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics made constant reference to Themistius, and claimed that no one could be found who was more learned: ‘proinde ado- rate verba Themistii’. I owe this reference to Edward Mahoney’s contribution (‘Aristotle and Some Late Medieval and Renaissance Philosophers’) to the volume The Impact of Aristotelianism on Modern Philosophy, edited by Ric- cardo Pozzo. 2 The book presents the papers of a 1999 conference on the Rezeptionsgeschichte of Aristotle’s conception of the intellectual virtues, but only some of the articles actually address this theme. One of these is Stanley 2 R. Pozzo (ed.), The Impact of Aristotelianism on Modern Philosophy (Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, vol. 39), Washington D.C. (The Catholic University of America Press) 2003; xvi 336 pp.; ISBN 0 8132 1347 9; £50.50. + 252 BOOK NOTES Rosen’s ‘Phronesis or Ontology: Aristotle and Heidegger’, which focuses on Heidegger’s 1924/5 Marburg lectures on Plato’s Sophistes and on how they misinterpret or adapt (the difference is not always clear in Heidegger) Aristotle’s conception of phronêsis by taking it as ‘der Ernst der bestimmten Entscheidung’ and as the silent call of Gewissen (consciousness). Heidegger shifts the focus of application of phronêsis from the practical to the ontolog- ical level and by doing so rather blurs the Aristotelian distinction between theory and practice, while actually ‘transforming both into poetry’ (thus Rosen, on p. 258). And of course this ontology derives all significance of human life from its finitude, and the terror of its obliteration (Angst vom Tode), to which man may respond by deciding to act ‘authentically’. It is here, in fact, that phronêsis comes in – an odd appearance, if one takes into con- sideration that Aristotle instead emphasizes the possibility of leading a supra- human life and that for him eudaimônia rather than Angst is the central theme. In fact the general incompatibility between the two theories makes one won- der why Heidegger insisted on building on Aristotle in the first place. And what, in the end, is the net result? Rosen, for one, concludes that when com- pared to Aristotle’s conception of phronêsis with its orientation towards everyday life, ‘Heidegger’s existential ontology, however brilliant, and per- haps because of its very brilliance, can bring nothing to human affairs but blindness’ (p. 265). I am not quite sure I understand what this means, but I have no doubt it is right. Hans-Georg Gadamer happens to have been among those who attended Heidegger’s lectures on the Sophist, but, as Enrico Berti shows in his essay ‘The Reception of Aristotle’s Intellectual Virtues in Gadamer and the Hermeneutic Philosophy’, Gadamer’s Wahrheit und Methode as well as his 1998 commentary on NE VI remained much more faithful to Aristotle’s text and intentions, though Gadamer appears to have over-emphasized the practical element in Aristotle’s ethics, while playing down the role of theôria. With Michael Davis’ ‘defense’ of Aristotle against Nietzsche on tragedy (‘Tragedy in the Philosophic Age of the Greeks: Aristotle’s Reply to Nietzsche’) we move away from the main topic. Nietzsche’s critique, as is well known, centered on Aristotle’s rationalizing and cognitivist approach to tragedy. The upshot of D.’s defense seems to be that the Poetics is not just about poiêsis in the sense of ‘making poetry’, but also directly about human behaviour (p. 216: ‘poiêsis understood as action’) a curious claim which to my mind gets insufficient support from the juxtaposition of Doric dran and Attic prattein and poiein in Poet. 1048b1-2. D. concludes, if I understand him correctly, that the Poetics, in so far as it is about action, shows us how the action on stage (even when irrational) can figure as somehow exemplary, so that in this respect ‘Nietzsche does seem to have erred in underestimating Aristotle’s grasp of the intimacy of the relation between the rational and the irrational’ (p. 226). I am not sure whether this interpretation succesfully res- BOOK NOTES 253 cues Aristotle from Nietzsche’s critique; though it provides some room for the irrational, it still appears to do this in some sort of moralizing context. But perhaps I missed something, as in fact did the editor, who in his Introduction (p. xiv) claims that D. ‘points out that Nietzsche is right [my italics] in min- imizing Aristotle’s grasp of the intimacy of the relation between the rational and the irrational’ – the exact opposite of what the above quotation seems to say. I single out three further contributions all of them broadening their scope beyond the issue of the intellectual virtues, but all of them well worth read- ing. Mahoney’s article ‘Aristotle and Some Late Medieval and Renaissance Philosophers’, already referred to above, offers a selective but informative overview of the reception of Aristotle and his ancient commentators in medieval and renaissance philosophy, of course without breaking much new ground for those acquainted with the author’s own earlier work and with Charles B. Schmitt’s classic study Aristotle in the Renaissance. Also the solid contributions of Antonino Poppi (on ‘Zabarella or Aristotelianism as a Rigorous Science’) and William A. Wallace (‘The Influence of Galileo’s Logic and Its Use in His Science’) basically take up and summarize earlier work by the same authors. They demonstrate a common ground between Zabarella and Galileo in their use of the Aristotelian regressus i.e. the com- bination of analysis (starting from the effects, ‘better known to us’, arriving at a mere approximate or hypothetical discovery of principles and supplying knowledge quia) and synthesis (moving from principles to the effects deriv- ing from those principles, and supplying knowledge propter quid). Between the two stages there is a reflective pause which should allow one to deter- mine that the cause found is really the one that is true and necessarily bound to the effect. This is what Zabarella calls a mentale ipsius causae examen. I would maintain that in Aristotle’s own works this role is being played by dialectical scrutiny. Zabarella rather seems to have thought of something like mathematical analysis. Galileo, who remains committed to the overall frame- work of the Aristotelian regressus, introduces a crucial innovation in linking the examen of this intermediate stage to attestation by the senses and to exper- iment (periculum). It is clear, however, that both Zabarella and Galileo thought of the doctrine of the Posterior Analytics, on which the conception of regressus was based, as offering essentially a methodus for scientific inves- tigations (on which more below). 3 3 Other contributions: John P. Doyle, ‘Wrestling with a Wraith: André Semery, S. J. (1630-1717) on Aristotle’s Goat-Stag and Knowing the Unknowable’; Christia Mercer, ‘Leibniz, Aristotle and Ethical Knowledge’; Richard L. Velkley, ‘Speech, Imagination, Origins: Rousseau and the Political Animal’; Riccardo Pozzo, ‘Kant on the Five Intellectual Virtues’; Alfredo Ferrarin, ‘Hegel’s Appropriation of the Aristotelian Intellect’; Richard Cobb-Stevens, ‘The Presence of Aristotelian Nous in Husserl’s Philosophy’. 254 BOOK NOTES A similar volume, which appeared a few years earlier, edited by Bob Sharples, is Whose Aristotle? Whose Aristotelianism? 4 It features, among other contri- butions, fine essays by M. W. F. Stone on ‘The Debate on the Soul in the Second Half of the Thirteenth Century’ (which in passing has valuable things to say about the origin and limitations of the notion of ‘Aristotelianism’), by Jonathan Barnes on ‘Locke and the Syllogism’, and by Enrico Berti on Brentano’s influential interpretations of Aristotle’s metaphysics and theology (‘Brentano and Aristotle’s Metaphysics’). Monique Dixsaut (‘Is There Such a Thing as Nietzsche’s Aristotle?’) offers a clear and systematic survey of Nietszche’s reaction(s) to Aristotle’s Poetics, including his views on katharsis, the role of the chorus and the importance of dramatic performance, and his negative view of Aristotelian ethics as the ethics of ‘Aristotle and everyone’. 5 My next book could in principle have been covered in the book notes on Neoplatonism as well, but may be better at home here. For many centuries Porphyry’s Introduction (Eisagôgê) played a key role in the philosophical cur- riculum, although nowadays it is no longer among the favourites of students of ancient philosophy. We are fortunate to have a translation – the first one to be published in English – with introduction and extensive commentary (288 pages on 19 pages of translated text) by Jonathan Barnes, published in the Clarendon Later Ancient Philosophers series. 6 As is well known, this little treatise discusses five items (genus, species, difference, property, accident) which later became known as the praedicabilia or the pente phônai or quinque voces, i.e. ‘the five words’ (on the history of these terms, see further L. M. De Rijk, Aristotle. Semantics and Ontology, vol. 1, Leiden/Boston/Köln 2002, 491-498). According to Porphyry’s preface, knowing what these items are is necessary ‘even for a schooling in Aristotle’s predications [. . .] and also for the presentation of definitions, and generally for matters concerning division and proof’. B. is probably right in characterizing this text as an introduction to logic, and hence to philosophy in general, rather than as just an introduc- tion to the Categories (the view of many earlier commentators, such as Ammonius; note, however, that not too much is at stake here, since the Cat. was itself generally regarded as an introduction to philosophy). The Platonist Porphyry claims that he has taken his material from ‘the old masters – and espe- 181 pp.; ISBN 0 7546 1362 3; £ 35.00. 5 Other contributions: Helen S. Lang, ‘Philoponus’ Aristotle: The Extension of Place’; Ahmed Hasnawi, ‘Topics and Analysis: the Arabic Tradition’; William Charlton, ‘Aquinas on Aristotle on Immortality’; there are also responses by François de Gandt to the contributions of Jonathan Barnes and Monique Dixsaut. 6 Porphyry’s Introduction, edited by Jonathan Barnes, Oxford (Clarendon Press) 2003; xxvi + 415 pp.; ISBN 0 19 9246149; £ 50.00. + 4 R. W. Sharples (ed.), Whose Aristotle? Whose Aristotelianism?, Aldershot (Ashgate) 2001; ix
[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ] zanotowane.pldoc.pisz.plpdf.pisz.plhot-wife.htw.pl
|
|
Cytat |
Dobry przykład - połowa kazania. Adalberg I ty, Brutusie, przeciwko mnie?! (Et tu, Brute, contra me?! ) Cezar (Caius Iulius Caesar, ok. 101 - 44 p. n. e) Do polowania na pchły i męża nie trzeba mieć karty myśliwskiej. Zygmunt Fijas W ciepłym klimacie najłatwiej wyrastają zimni dranie. Gdybym tylko wiedział, powinienem był zostać zegarmistrzem. - Albert Einstein (1879-1955) komentując swoją rolę w skonstruowaniu bomby atomowej
|
|