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1
ÒFunctional differentiation and sectors: between Sociology and International
RelationsÓ
Mathias Albert and Barry Buzan
Paper presented at the Sixth Pan-European International Relations Conference, Turin,
13-16 July 2007; Panel 4-20
DRAFT ---PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE OR CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION
WORK IN PROGRESS-COMMENTS ARE HIHGLY WELCOME:
Contacts:
;
1. Introduction
Within the international system of states, functional differentiation does not seem to
exist: in fact, the lack of functional differentiation between states as Òlike unitsÓ is one
of the main characteristics Kenneth Waltz employs to describe the international system
in his
Theory of International Politics
(Waltz, 1979: 97). However, it is noteworthy
that Waltz describes the international system not only through the properties it has
(such as an anarchical structure), but also through a property it
lacks
(i.e. the
functional differentiation between its units). The prominence which Waltz accords to
pointing out that there is no functional differentiation in the international system of
states only seems to make sense against a background assumption that the international
system forms an exception to other kinds of social systems in which functional
differentiation would be expected as a rule. This assumption should not come as a
surprise given that Waltz developed his theory in an intellectual environment strongly
influenced by a resurgence of the theory of functional differentiation in the North
American social sciences in the 1960s, most notably in and through the works of
Talcott Parsons (who claimed that his description of society as a functionally
differentiated social system of action would generally apply to all social systems, but
did not spell it out for the international system).
In readings of WaltzÓ work the possibility of some kind of functional differentiation
between the units of the interstate system has repeatedly been raised (see, for example,
Ruggie, 1983; Buzan/Jones/Little, 1993: 238-40; S¾rensen, 2000). However, it is
noteworthy that most conceptualizations which challenge the idea that international
relations could adequately be described in terms of an anarchically structured system
of states have tended to neglect the issue of functional differentiation when it comes to
describing the basic characteristics of international or world society. Instead, they
2
propose to interpret the international system as either a distinct realm or a logic of
action (Albert/Brock, 2006) which exists in addition and next to those of international
society, or as an international or world society (Buzan, 2004). Even Wendt (1999: 256,
356), one of the leading sociological critics of the neorealistÓs anarchy assumption,
makes only passing reference to FD. This is all the more surprising as functional
differentiation continues to serve as one of the main leading concepts employed by
classic as well as contemporary sociological theory in order to describe modern
society(ies).
However, although upon first impression the concept of functional differentiation is
not treated explicitly, let alone systematically, in analyses of international society and
world society (with the exception of IR readings of the Luhmannian concept of world
society; see Albert/Hilkermeier, 2004), it is implicit as a theme in that it is common
practice in IR to try to simplify the study of the disciplineÓs subject by approaching it
in terms of sectors defined along broadly functional lines. While conceptual
discussions of the notion of ÒsectorsÓ in IR are still relatively rare (but see below),
sectoral analysis marks a wide-spread practice in IR which refers to approaching the
international system in terms of the
types
of activities, units, interactions and structures
within it. The use of terms such as Òthe international economic systemÓ or Òthe
international political system indicate thinking in terms of sectoral divisions of the
subject as does the term international society itself. Realists from Morgenthau to Waltz
talk firmly in terms of political theory, assuming that dividing the subject into sectors
is a necessary condition for effective theory-building. Michael Mann (1986: ch. 1)
thinks about power in terms of sector-like distinctions amongst ideology, economic,
military and political power. Despite the prevalence of thinking about the social world
in terms of sectors, exactly what this means has received much less discussion in the
IR theory literature than levels of analysis (Buzan, Jones and Little, 1993: 30-33;
Buzan and Little, 2000: 68-77).
The present paper starts from this observation that although quite a range of IR
theories think broadly in terms of a functional differentiation into sectors, this sectoral
differentiation is mostly employed as a heuristic device, whereas the full theoretical
background and analytical potential of the concept of functional differentiation in IR
remain little understood. It seeks to provide a reading of some basic tenets of
sociological theories of functional differentiation in order to assess whether and to
what degree these can be employed in order to refine our understanding of how
international system, international society, and world society are differentiated into
sectors. In the process, one has to bear in mind that the division between international
system, international society, and world society in itself partly reflects some kind of
functional differentiation, thus forcing open the question, central to the debates in
Sociology, of what ÒwholeÓ it is that is thus differentiated (more on SociologyÓs Òunity
of differenceÓ later). In so doing, however, the aim is not simply to ÒimportÓ a
sociological concept into IR, but also to assess the limits of its applicability to a field
3
on which Sociology itself has by and large either avoided discussion, or at times even
dabbled in amateurishly without engaging with IR literature (Parsons, 1961). With the
notable exception of some historical sociologists (Mann, Wallerstein, Tilly, Hobson,
Reus-Smit), and more arguably Luhmann (on which more below) Sociology as a
discipline has been largely driven by two assumptions: 1) that societies are composed
of individual human beings; and 2) that societies can be understood using organic
metaphors from biology. Both of these assumptions have worked to block sociologists
from thinking about international societies. The assumption that societies must be
composed of individuals precludes thinking about a society of states, where the units
are collective entities. The organic metaphor presupposes that societies are cohesive
entities and opens the fruitful path into analyzing their development in terms of
functional differentiation (with complex organisms/societies being more functionally
differentiated that primitive ones). The organic metaphor also opens up the idea that
the coherence or unity of society is based on how its functionally differentiated
subsystems relate to each other. For these reasons, and rather like political theory, most
of mainstream Sociology is more concerned about what goes on within collective
entities than
between
them. We thus end up with a division of labour ridiculous even
by academic standards in which sociologists have become interested in the state, and
international politics people have taken up the study of international society.
The argument will proceed in six steps. In the next section we outline some basic ideas
of functional differentiation from the sociological literature. Rather than provide a full
introduction to what constitutes one of the main themes of classical and modern
sociological thought, we focus on those aspects of functional differentiation which
seem to be relevant for the analysis of social relations beyond the realm of the nation-
state. In section 3 we inspect the conceptualization of functional differentiation and
sectors in the IR literature. We show how WaltzÓs narrowing of the term functional
differentiation blocked off a proper discussion of the concept in IR. Sectors in IR are
closer to functional differentiation, but there is still a significant gap between an
increasingly wide-spread application of sectoral analysis in IR and the relative brevity
of explicit conceptual discussions on the subject matter. In section 4 we start to draw
together the discussion of functional differention from Sociology and sectors from IR
by examining three underlying questions: What is the ÒwholeÓ that is disaggregated
into functions or sectors? Do the things that result from this disaggregation have
ontological or analytical status? And how do levels of analysis fit into thinking in
terms of functional differentiation. [This paper only covers the first two questions and
not the third]
Section 5 [not yet written] will apply the more unified sense of functional
differentiation and sectors to clarifying the various uses of the notions of ÒsystemÓ and
ÒsocietyÓ afloat in Sociology and International Relations.
Section 6 [not yet written] will explore whether structural transformations in
international/world society could, on a systems level, be adequatlely described in terms
4
of a competition between/transformation of forms of primary and secondary
differentiation.
Section 7 [not yet written] will reflect on what the relationship between Sociology and
IR should be: competitors or (somewhat strange) bedfellows?
2. Functional Differentiation in Sociological Theory
Functionalism, and in this context ideas about the functional differentiation (hereafter
FD) in and of society, form one of the big Òmeta-narrativesÓ of sociological theory,
next to concepts such as modernization or rationalization (see Thomas, forthcoming).
The origins of functionalist thought can be traced back to the works of Herbert
Spencer (1966), who in fact formulated elements of a theory of social
evolution
well
before Darwin did so for the natural world. Spencer not only formulated the basis, but
actually preceded many later modern theories of differentiation in that he shifted the
imagery from the question of how some kind of (incoherent) homogeneity in the social
world is established and preserved, to the question of how society functions and
evolves as a (coherent) heterogeneity:
The advance of organization which thus follows the advance of
aggregation, alike in individual organisms and in social organisms,
conforms in both cases to the same general law: differentiations
proceed from the more general to the more special. First broad and
simple contrasts of parts; then within each of the parts primarily
contrasted, changes which make unlike divisions of them; then within
each of these unlike divisions, minor unlikelinesses; and so on
continually (Spencer, 1966: £230).
While the general idea that society is to be conceived of as some kind of Òorganic
wholeÓ lies at the basis of sociological thought, it should be noted that this analogy
was partly due to the efforts of the early sociologists to establish sociology as a
ÒrespectedÓ science in relation to the natural sciences (see Turner/Maryanski, 1979: 5).
However, it firmly establishes the problem of the unity of the social at the heart of
sociological theory: what legitimizes thinking of ÒsocietyÓ as something Òhanging
togetherÓ in any meaningful sense? And what legitimizes upholding an assumption of
even a minimal unity if a high degree of diversity and differentiation of society is
acknowledged (the Òunity-in-diversityÓ/
unitas multiplex
-problematique)? This question
becomes particularly pertinent if one of the most obvious answers accounting for the
unity of society, the idea that society essentially forms a
national
society, is
relinquished.
At the heart of classical sociological thought, starting with Spencer and Comte, and
5
particularly developed further by Durkheim and Weber, lies the thought that society as
some kind of a ÒwholeÓ is
differentiated
. While different
forms of differentiation
may
coexist and vary over time - the main forms to be identified in history being
stratificatory, segmentary, and FD - modern industrial society is particularly
characterized by the form of FD. Using an over-simplifying image, FD expresses an
ongoing Òdivision of laborÓ (Durkheim), i.e. the idea that specialized parts of society,
e.g. politics, law, the economy etc., fulfill functions for society and thus allow for a
more efficient reproduction of society than would be possible without functional
specialization. While by and large the diagnosis that society is characterized by FD is
unchallenged (although not the degree to which this is the case nor the relation
between functional and other forms of differentiation), the answers as to what it is that
holds society together despite the centrifugal tendency of an ongoing differentiation
vary widely. Most refer to some kind of common value system or, more abstractly,
some kind of ÒcommunityÓ necessarily underlying a society.
It seems fair to say that this relatively simple idea of a somehow preexisting social
whole named ÒsocietyÓ, permanently being torn apart by the tendencies of an ever-
increasing specialization/FD yet held together by an underlying community, forms the
background of classical sociological thought. Much of functionalist thought in the 20
th
century has been dealing with two basic problems inherent in this simple model: first,
the idea of FD leaves open whether what is at stake is primarily a
process
, describing
the evolution of society, or whether in fact it primarily describes the way society is
structured
. Second, and intimately related to this problem is the relation between
functional and causal analysis. Although identified as separate by Durkheim, yet
difficult to separate in practice, functional analyses over time are full of a conflation
between these two questions. Yet: ÒCausal analysis asks: Why does the structure in
question exist and reveal certain properties? Functional analysis asks: What need of
the larger systems does the structure meet? To confuse the two questions is to invite an
illegitimate teleology where consequences cause the events producing themÓ
(Turner/Maryanski, 1979: 17-8). From these two basic problems follows a third, which
will become of particular importance when we later turn to the issue of societies other
than nation-state societies, relating to the question of whether to speak of FD primarily
refers to a FD in society, or a FD of society. The difference is more than a minor
semantic issue as it addresses the question of whether society can indeed be seen as
some historically pre-existing whole in which at some point processes of FD take off.
Or whether it is actually processes of FD, i.e. the emergence of recognizably different
spheres of politics, law, economics, religion etc. which account for the existence of
society as a Òsocial wholeÓ in the first place (see Nassehi, 2004).
While the aforementioned problems represent basic challenges to theories of FD, they
have been dealt with in innovative ways by a number of functionalist thinkers
(although they arguably still lie at the heart of much functionalist thought when it is
applied to a global level, a point to which we will return below). The most
comprehensive reformulation and further development of early functionalist thought,
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